The Department of Atomic Energy has released the draft Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Rules, 2026, and draft SHANTI Regulations, 2026, for public consultation, providing the detailed framework for implementing the SHANTI Act, 2025. The proposed rules provide a detailed framework for licensing, safety, security, nuclear liability and financial protection, while also setting out provisions for the wider use of nuclear energy. The draft seeks to establish a regulatory framework covering the lifecycle of nuclear installations, participation of operators, use of foreign technologies, and management of nuclear materials and spent fuel. Additionally, the drafts seek to operationalise the opening of the civil nuclear sector to wider public and private participation while establishing provisions for licensing, safety authorisation, nuclear liability, insurance, radioactive waste management and regulatory oversight.
Key proposals
Licensing framework: The draft framework proposes a single composite licence covering the entire lifecycle of a nuclear power plant or reactor, from construction, ownership and operation to eventual decommissioning. Separate licences for individual activities within this lifecycle will not be permitted. It also sets out licensing requirements for a range of nuclear-sector activities, including fuel cycle facilities; exploration, mining and processing of uranium and thorium; manufacture of radiation sources and non-power nuclear applications; and domestic and international trade and transportation of nuclear fuel, equipment, technology and radioactive materials.
Project approval: The licensing authority may grant in-principle approval after admitting an application where the site or technology has not been selected. Upon receipt of a valid in-principle approval, the applicant may proceed with negotiation with reactor technology vendors and for acquiring the land and other necessary infrastructure.
Safety and security: The draft rules also prescribe requirements for nuclear material management, facility security and regulatory compliance. Operators will be required to maintain detailed records of nuclear materials, conduct material-balance assessments and regularly verify inventories of nuclear substances. They will also need to appoint an approved officer responsible for nuclear material accounting and compliance with related regulatory requirements.
The framework envisages multiple layers of physical protection at nuclear facilities, including restrictions on access to sensitive areas, to minimise the risks of theft, sabotage and unauthorised access. It also mandates the protection of digital systems used in nuclear installations and imposes controls on the handling and dissemination of sensitive nuclear information. In addition, radioactive waste must be managed, contained and disposed of in accordance with prescribed regulatory standards. Operators would remain responsible for compliance with applicable safety and radiation-protection standards, while the composite licence would remain subject to periodic regulatory reviews and ongoing compliance requirements throughout the operational life of the plant.
Technology requirements: For foreign-designed reactors and nuclear power plants, the draft rules prescribe specific requirements. A foreign reactor design would have to be certified or approved by the nuclear regulatory authority of its country of origin and must already be in operation either in that country or another foreign country. The country of origin is defined as one with an established and self-reliant ecosystem for nuclear reactor design and supply, with regulatory approvals considered globally credible. Imported or domestically sourced nuclear technologies would also have to meet India’s public health and safety requirements, pose no unreasonable risk to people or the environment, and comply with national policies framed under the SHANTI Act. The draft also provides for periodic review of operator liability and prescribes conditions relating to foreign reactor technology.
Nuclear applications: Alongside the proposed liability framework, the draft rules envisage a broader role for nuclear energy across multiple sectors. In addition to electricity generation, the framework covers applications such as captive power generation, process heat, hydrogen production, medical isotope production, education, training and research. The draft also proposes the use of nuclear captive power for hard-to-abate industries and emerging technology-driven sectors. These include data centres, quantum technologies, high-performance computing, semiconductor manufacturing and AI-enabled applications.
Government installations: The draft proposes a separate framework for nuclear installations owned by the central government. In specified cases, operators of such installations would not be required to obtain insurance or other financial security. Instead, the central government would assume liability for damages attributable to the operator. The centre would constitute an expert group every five years to review the maximum limits of an operator’s civil liability for nuclear damage. The group would include experts in nuclear science and engineering, actuarial science, insurance and law, as well as public interest representatives.
Liability and financial security: The draft also proposes a Nuclear Liability Fund, which would be funded through a levy on operators. A separate spent fuel management fund is proposed for the future management of spent fuel being handed over to the centre.
The draft requires nuclear operators to maintain financial protection against potential nuclear damage through an insurance policy, financial security or a combination of both. Operators of nuclear installations would be strictly liable for nuclear damage on a no-fault basis, including nuclear damage caused during the carriage of nuclear material.
Financial safeguards would also form part of the framework. Operators would be required to maintain financial capacity until all spent nuclear fuel has been removed from the relevant storage pool, along with insurance and other financial security against nuclear damage. The financial security would have to remain valid for an extended period and, according to the draft, would be irrevocable until all spent fuel has been removed from the spent fuel storage pool after being taken out of the reactor core.
Where shares, bonds or other financial instruments are used as financial security, these instruments would have to be pledged to the Central Government, with a security margin of 1:1.33 maintained. In the event of any shortfall in the required financial security, the operator would have to immediately cover it through additional insurance or financial security.
Conclusion
Overall, the drafts provide the operational framework for implementing the SHANTI Act and support India’s longer-term objective of expanding nuclear power capacity to 100 GW by 2047. By setting out provisions on licensing, technology eligibility, captive generation, insurance and operator responsibilities, the framework offers greater regulatory clarity for private and foreign participation.
Going forward, effective implementation would depend on streamlined procedures, coordination among stakeholders and consistent enforcement of safety, security and financial requirements. Continued oversight of nuclear materials, radioactive waste, digital systems and physical protection will remain essential.
